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1.

INTRODUCTION

This essay addresses an evolving legal concept, "ceremonial deism." The Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment bars government from "pass[ing] laws which aid one religion,
1

aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." The legal concept 66 Ceremonia1 deism,"
however, would shield the Pledge of Allegiance, legislative prayers, and other government
references to religion from strict analysis under the Lemon test, endorsement test, and coercion
test-i.e., from routine adjudication under the Establishment Clause. To illustrate, consider a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Pledge. "The addition ofthe words 'under God' to the
Pledge does, and was [legislatively] intended to, have the effect of endorsing religion. " 2
Granting this, the Pledge would seem destined to fail the Lemon and endorsement tests, in view
of its impermissible religious purpose and effect. 3 On the strength of"ceremonial deism,"
however, a court may declare that ''under God" is merely ceremonial, and that it does not offend
the Establishment Clause. In support of this claim, the court will perform a sort of judicial
taxidermy, whereby religious words are killed if only to keep them on hand, safely, in civic halls.
Ceremonial deism invites such results by underplaying the sacred import of governmental
references to religion, and by stressii:J.g their value as rneans tu secular t:;uus. These secular ends
include recognition of the role that religion has played in our nation's development; 4 creation of

1

Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Stephen B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2091
(1996).
3
The endorsement test is often regarded as a refinement of the Lemon test, which examines a challenged
statute by means of a three-prong analysis: 1) does the statute have a secular purpose; 2) is it the primary
effect of that statute to advance or inhibit religion; 3) does the statute excessively entangle government with
religion. (See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)). The endorsement test couples prongs
one and two of the Lemon test and concentrates on whether a statute intended an endorsement and whether
an endorsement is nonetheless perceived. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
4
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[A]lthough these references speak in the language of religious belief, they are more properly understood
as employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes. One such purpose is to commemorate the role of

2

2

a ceremonial atmosphere during civic events; 5 and inspiration for overcoming a national crisis. 6
Ceremonial deism, in other words, stands for the proposition that it is appropriate to retain
government-sponsored religious speech for either of two reasons: to impart historic reflections
about our nation's past (the "description" argument), or to establish an appropriate air of dignity
during public assemblies (the "solemnization" argument).
Reliance on the argument for ceremonial deism creates special problems for a pluralistic
society. With each passing year, government acknowledgments of religion stand to marginalize
more individuals, whether adherents to minority religions or out-and-out unbelievers. Tests
under the Establishment Clause, therefore, should give sufficient attention to the effects of
official references to religion. Under the logic of ceremonial deism, however, a court need not
wrestle with the marginalizing effect of an official acknowledgment; rather, the court may deny
the threat of marginalization altogether by declaring the words at issue wholly void of religious
force.
In 2005, Justice O'Connor delivered the high court's first sustained analysis of
ceremonial deism. Her analysis culminated in a modification of the endorsement test-in the
form of a four-prong test to determine valid instances of ceremonial deism. This essay addresses
her test. Section II of this essay provides an overview of the origin and use of the term
ceremonial deism. Section III introduces Justice O'Connor's test for ceremonial deism and the
context in which she presented it. Section IV begins my critique of the test, pinpointing
assumptions made by Justice O'Connor prefatory to her submission of the test's prongs,
followed by an evaluation of the prongs themselves. Finally, Section V concludes this essay by
religion in our history.").
5 Lynch v. Donnelly, 466 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]hese references are uniquely
suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to
meet some national challenge .... ").
6

!d.
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arguing that Justice O'Connor's test fails to legitimate ceremonial deism.

II. THE ORIGIN AND USE OF THE TERM AND CONCEPT "CEREl\IIONIAL DEISM"

A. Academic Coinage of the Term and High Court Application Thereof
The term "ceremonial deism" originated in a 1962 lecture by Eugene Rostow, dean of
Yale Law School. 7 The coinage might well have died in its academic crib--the lecture remains
unpublished-if not for Harvard Professor Arthur Sutherland's reference to the term in a 1964
book review. 8 According to Sutherland, Rostow coined the term in order to describe a "class of
public activity, which ... could be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be
constitutional"9-i.e., to describe governmental expressions of religion that need not be adjudged
violations of the Establishment Clause.
The term ceremonial deism was explicitly used in three Supreme Court cases-in dissent
in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), 10 in the majority opinion in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU (1989), ll
and in concurrence in County ofAllegheny. 12
Justice Brennan used the term in Lynch, which upheld a city-maintained Christmas
display among whose Yule tree and Santa-related decorations appeared a creche. 13 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan explored principles under which the Court weighs government
acknowledgments of religion. 14 He confessed to uncertainty about this area of jurisprudence but
nonetheless extracted a baseline: "I would suggest that such practices as the designation of' In

7

Davison M. Douglas, Ceremonial Deism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 259 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 2006).
8
Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 Hastings L.J. 1, 54 n. 211 (2005).
9
Epstein, supra note 2, at 2174 n. 29.
10
Lynch, 466 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n. 46, and 603.
12
Id at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670.
14
!d. at 715-716.
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God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of
Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow' s apt phrase, as a form of
'ceremonial deism,' protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost
through rote repetition any significant religious content." 15 These practices and references, he
wrote, "are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public
occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply
could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious
phrases." 16
Justice Blackmun referred to ceremonial deism in County ofAllegheny, which announced
two decisions-one upholding a public holiday display that featured a Christmas tree, menorah,
and sign promoting "liberty," 17 located outside the City-County Building; the other decision
holding against a creche located on the staircase of the County Courthouse. 18 In the majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun quoted with approval Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, wherein
she referred to legislative prayer as an official acknowledgment of religion that "serve[s], in the
only wa[y] reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society." 19 Justice O'Connor did not use the term ceremonial deism in
Lynch, but Justice Blackmun viewed her analysis as illustrative of this doctrine. "The function

and history of this form of ceremonial deism," he continued, "suggest that 'those practices [the
Pledge and motto] are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious
15

Jd. at 716.
Id. at 717.
17
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 582 (the sign read: ~~During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of
freedom").
18
Id at 578.
19
!d. at 595, n. 46 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 669, 693) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16

5

beliefs. "'20 Later in his opinion, Justice Blackmun used the term ceremonial deism in a manner
indicative of the weight he accorded this concept; referring to Justice O'Connor's Lynch
concurrence and Justice Brennan's dissent in that case, he wrote:
Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the Pledge, characterizing

them as consistent with the proposition that govem.illent may not COllliTIUi'1icate an
endorsement of religious belief. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
716-717 (Brennan, J., dissenting). We need not return to the subject of 'ceremonial
deism' [Justice Blackmun cites to his earlier ceremonial deism reference in County of
Allegheny, supra note 12], because there is an obvious distinction between creche
displays and references to God in the motto and the Pledge. However history may affect
the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the government, history
cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular
sect or creed. 21
In her Allegheny concurrence, Justice O'Connor referred to legislative prayers and the
court crier's "God save the United States and this honorable Court" as instances of ceremonial
deism. 22 Quoting her Lynch concurrence, she repeated that such official acts "serve the secular
purposes of 'solemnizing public occasions' and 'expressing confidence in the future. "'23 She
continued: "These examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny
simply by virtue of their historical longevity alone. Historical acceptance of a practice does not
in itself validate that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values

In addition to these explicit references to ceremonial deism, the concept of ceremonial
deism implicitly informs the majority opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld the Nebraska
Legislature tradition of commencing its daily sessions with a chaplain-led prayer-the only

20

!d.
!d.
22
!d.
23
!d.
21

(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, 693) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 603-604.
at 630.
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

24ld.
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instance where such a prayer has withstood judicial scrutiny. 25 Although the practice failed the
Eighth Circuit's application of the Lemon test, 26 the Supreme Court upheld the practice on
account of its "unique history."27 Legislative prayer, according to the Court, ''is deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country,"28 is ~·part of the fabric of our society."

29

In fact, the Framers' position on the practice's constitutionality is evident from their actions:
"[T]hree days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains, final agreement was

°

reached on the language of the Bill ofRights."3 From that moment till the present, "the practice
of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious
freedom. " 31 ''To invoke Divine guidance on a public body ... is not, in these circumstances, an
'establishment' of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."32

B. Subsequent Use by the Lower Courts
The term ceremonial deism was subsequently used by U.S. Courts of Appeals. In

Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit Cotn1 upheld a school policy requiring daily Pledge recitations. 33 Judge Frank
Easterbrook, writing for the majority, based the cotn1's decision on the perception that "under
God" amounted to a mere ceremonial reference, a phrase empty of its "original religious

25

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. Neb. 1982) (the practice failed the purpose and effect prongs
because the chaplaincy promoted one religion, inasmuch as the Legislature had reappointed a Presbyterian
minister to the chaplaincy for sixteen years running, and had published his prayers; and failed the
entanglement prong because state money was used in order to pay for the chaplain and said prayers).
27
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
28
!d. at 787.
29
!d. at 792.
30
!d. at 788.
31
Id. at 787.
32
Id. at 792.
33
Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F. 2d 437 (7th Cir. Ill. 1992).
26

7

significance."34 In doing so, the court favorably referenced Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynchnamely, "the reference[] to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be
understood, in Dean Rostow' s apt phrase, as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any
significant religious content."35 Further, the court quoted from Allegheny:
Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the pledge, characterizing
them as consistent with the proposition that the government may not communicate an
endorsement of religious belief.... We need not return to the subject of 'ceremonial
deism,' ... because there is an obvious distinction between creche displays and
references to God in the motto and the pledge. 36
Directly following this quote, Justice Easterbrook noted, "Plaintiffs observe that the Court
sometimes changes tune when it confronts a subject directly. True enough, but an inferior court
had best respect what the majority says rather than read between the lines. If th.e Court proclaims
that a practice is consistent with the Establishment Clause, we take its assurance seriously."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court used the term in Gaylor v. United

States, where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the national motto, ''In God We
Trust."

37

The motto, they argued, violated the Establishment Clause. The court, however, said

the motto's "primary effect is not to advance religion; instead, it is a form of 'ceremonial deism'
which through historical usage and ubiquity cannot be reasonably understood to convey
government approval of religious belief. " 38 The court supported this reference to ceremonial
deism with citations to Justice O'Connor concurrences in Lynch and Allegheny, along with a
citation to Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch. 39

34

!d. at 447.
!d. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
36
!d. at 447-448 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-603 (Blackmun, J., majority opinion)).
37
Gaylorv. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (lOth Cir. Colo. 1996).
38
/dat216.
39 !d.
35

8

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit used the term ceremonial deism in a majority
opinion. 40 The judge-petitioner in that case, North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal
Foundation v. Constangy, argued that his habit of opening court with prayer was no more an

official endorsement than the national motto or "God save the United State's and this Honorable
Court."41 Citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Allegheny, the court countered: '~[T]hese
brief references to God have been repeated so often that their religious meaning has diminished
[sic] so that they are merely examples of 'ceremonial deism. "'42

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used the term ceremonial deism in its majority
opinion in A CL U v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd 43 Addressing a challenge to Ohio's
state motto, "In God, all things are possible," the court maintained that the motto ''fits
comfortably within this country's long and deeply entrenched tradition of civic piety, or
~ceremonial deism,' as Yale Law School's Eugene Rostow called it."44 The court then quoted

Marsh: "Like state-financed prayers by a legislative chaplain, 'it is simply a tolerable

acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country. '"45
As these examples demonstrate, lower courts have embraced the Supreme Court's use of
the term ceremonial deism. Until2004, however, the Court had yielded no sustained analysis of
the concept; accordingly, lower courts lacked conceptual boundaries. One danger, inherent in
the Court's use of ceremonial deism, was that courts would perpetrate a secular gutting of
religion, upholding official acknowledgements of religion by decreeing them serviceable but no
longer spiritual. The harm was that some nonbelievers and religious adherents would yet feel the

40

North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation v. Constangy, 947 F. 2d 1145 (4th Cir. N.C.
1991).
41
1d. at 1151.
42
ld. (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
43
ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001).
44
Id. at 300.
45 ld.

9

sting of words hostile to their creed or guiding principles, while other religious adherents would
learn, courtesy of magistrates, that they had been laboring under the misapprehension that choice
religious words retained religious significance. In what follows, I examine whether Justice
O'Connor put some or all of these concerns to rest in 2005.

Ill. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S TEST FOR CEREMONIAL DEISM: CONTEXT AND BRIEF OVERVIEW

In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice O'Connor fashioned a test to
identify constitutionally protected forms of ceremonial deism. 46 At issue in the case was a
California public school code that required teachers to open class with daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. Respondent Michael Newdow, an atheist, argued that inclusion of the
words "under God" violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. He brought suit
on behalf of his daughter, a student in the school district, challenging the district's recitation
policy and the Pledge itself. Newdow lost at District Court, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding both the school policy and the Pledge unconstitutional. 47 Subsequent
to this holding, the child's biological mother, Sandra Banning, filed a motion for leave to
intervene, arguing that she retained sole legal custody of their daughter, that neither she nor her
uaughit:r shart:u 1~t:wuuw's

av~;;;rsiou

iu

i.h~;;; s~.;huul puli~.;y,

aml that Newduw's putsuit oftht:

action would harm their daughter. 48 The Ninth Circuit reconvened in order to address Newdow's
standing in light of the altered custodial rights. 49 The court denied Banning's motion and held
that Newdow had standing, which he now exercised on behalf of his own interests and not on
46

Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 33 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit later amended its
decision, limiting the holding to the school district's policy (Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466
(9th Cir. 2002)).
48
Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 9. The custody order was granted prior to Newdow's appeal before the Ninth
Circuit (Newdow v. United States Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2002)).
49
Following the custody order, a superior court judge "entered an in personam order enjoining Newdow
from pleading his daughter as an unnamed part or representing here as a 'next friend' in his lawsuit." Jd. at
502.
47

10

behalf of his daughter's as well. 5° "Neither Ms. Banning's personal opinion regarding the
Constitution nor her state court award of legal custody is determinative ofNewdow's legal rights
,51
.
.
to protect h lS own Interests.

The Supreme Court heard Elk Grove Unified School District's appeal in 2004. A
procedural matter, however, brought the issue to an anticlimactic end: a majority of the Court
held that Newdow, a noncustodial parent, lacked standing. 52 Nonetheless, three justicesRehnquist, 53 O'Connor, 54 and Thomas55-were prepared to go to the merits, and, further, to hold
the Pledge constitutional.
Justice O'Connor begins her concurrence by stating that the endorsement test should
control in Establishment Clause cases. 56 Introduced by Justice O'Connor in Lynch,57 the
endorsement test stands for the proposition that government action "must not make a person's
religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by conveying a
message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. "'58 Two principles
inform application of the endorsement test. The first principle is that courts must examine
official acknowledgments of religion from the viewpoint of a "reasonable observer."59 The
second principle is that the "reasonable observer" must be "deemed aware of the history of the

50

Owing to the superior court order (supra note 41 ), N ewdow no longer sought redress on behalf of the
alleged injury to his daughter. See Newdow, 313 F.3d at 502.
51
!d. at 505.
52
Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 18 (holding that "it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution ofthe
lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing").
53
ld at 18.
54
ld at 33.
55
ld at 45.
56
ld at 34.
57
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
59
Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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conduct in question, and must understand its place in our Nation's culturallandscape." 60
Justice 0' Connor explains her understanding of and rationale for ceremonial deism
before supplementing the endorsement test with a new, four-factor analysis. "The constitutional
value of ceremonial deism," she writes, "turns on a shared understanding of its legitimate
nonreligious purposes." 6 i Justice O'Connor submits two reasons why the Court should permit
government "to refer to or commemorate religion in public life. " 62 The first reason is that
religious references can serve the secular purpose of commemorating national history. 63 The
second reason is that religious references can uniquely serve the secular purpose of solemnizing
public events. 64 Justice O'Connor states that such references and acknowledgments are
permissible in "a discrete category of cases"-a "category of 'ceremonial deism"' including the
national motto, court invocations ("God save the United States and this Honorable Court"), and
patriotic songs. 65
Justice O'Connor next unveils a four-prong test to determine whether the Pledge offends
the Establishment Clause or, rather, represents a permissible form of ceremonial deism. 66 The
test's first prong examines the "history and ubiquity" of a practice. The longer a practice has
been observed throughout the Nation's history, the more deserving that practice is of
constitutional protection. Similarly, the more a practice has circulated among citizens (i.e., the
more ubiquitous it is), the more deserving that practice is of constitutional protection.
The second prong is ~'absence of worship or prayer. " 67 A practice forfeits constitutional
protection to the extent that it seeks to place individuals in a "penitent state of mind, or ... create
60

!d.
!d.
62
!d.
63 !d.
64
!d.
65
!d.
66 !d.
67
!d.
61

at 35.
at 37.
at 35.
at 36.
at 37.
at 39.
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a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid." 68 "Only in the most extraordinary circumstances
could actual worship and prayer be defended as ceremonial deism. " 69
The third prong is "absence of reference to particular religion." 70 "[N]o religious
acknowledgement could claim to be an instance of ceremonial deism if it explicitly favored one
particular religious belief system over another." 71
The fourth prong is "minimal religious content"-i.e., requisite "brevity of a reference to
religion or to God in a ceremonial exercise," relative to the balance of the speech content. 72
IV. EXAMINING THE TEST FOR CEREMONIAL DEISM

A. Assumptions Foundational to the Test
Justice O'Connor predicates her test for ceremonial deism on three assumptions. These
assumptions appear in her overview of ceremonial deism, which precedes her enunciation of the
four-prong test. First, Justice O'Connor states that the endorsement test should govern analysis
of the Pledge, and that this test relies on the "viewpoint of the reasonable observer." 73 "Given
the dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation," she writes, "adopting a subjective approach
would reduce the test to an absurdity." 74 On its face, however, the endorsement test exists to
protect individuals at the margins of society: "Endorsement, I have explained,

~sends

a message

to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. "' 75 The difficulty with this standard is that the reasonable observer, shorn of any
dissident religious or counter-religious feelings, will find little to object to, and will therefore
68

!d. at 40.
!d. (citing lvfarsh, 463 U.S. 783).
70
!d. at 42.
71 !d.
69

72/d.
73
74

75

Id at 34.
!d. at 34-35.
!d. at 34.
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leave some members of society without a voice in forums of justice.
Second, Justice 0' Connor assumes that official references to religion attend to secular,
not sacred, ends. "I believe that although these references speak in the language of religious
belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially secular
purposes."76 These secular purposes fall into two categories, one serving historical purposes, L~e
other serving inspirational purposes. The former role of ceremonial deism allows government
~~to commemorate the role of religion in our history." 77 On this assumption, government

references to religion are merely "descriptive,"78 not normative or prescriptive. The inspirational
role, meanwhile, assumes that official references to religion '"serve, in the only ways reasonably
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society."' 79 Ironically, the argument from historical use admits religion (we are
permitted to reflect upon religion's role in shaping our land), but the argument from inspirational
use excludes it (religious words are said to inspire predominantly secular emotions). Justice
O'Connor does not account for this inconsistency. "Such references," she states, "can serve to
solemnize an occasion instead of to invoke divine provenance." 80 It is easy to understand the
solemnizing effect-i.e., that religious words add moment to an event-but it is less easy to
understand hovv these words effect a secular rather than religious air. If anything, their capacity
to achieve the one result suggests a capacity to achieve the other-namely, for religious words to
convey religious meaning.

76

!d. at 35.
!d.
See id. at 40 ('~Even if taken literally, the phrase ['under God'] is merely descriptive; it purports only to
identify the United States as a Nation subject to divine authority").
79
/d. at 36 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 669, 692-693) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80
!d. at 36.
77
78
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Finally, Justice O'Connor draws upon her first and second assumptions to make a third
assumption: "The reasonable observer discussed above, fully aware of our national history and
the origins of such practices, would not perceive these acknowledgments as signifying a
government endorsement of any specific religion, or even of religion over nonreligion." 81 Thus
derived, the third assumption rests upon these bases with something less than analytic firmness.
The following critique of Justice O'Connor's will revisit these assumptions. It is important,
though, to bear them in mind, in view of the fact that they are foundational to any apology for
ceremonial deism.

B. The Test's Four Prongs
Justice O'Conner, having provided an overview of the endorsement test, along
with the above assertions about ceremonial deism, observes: "This case requires us to
determine whether the appearance of the phrase 'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance
constitutes an instance of such ceremonial deism. Although it is a close question, I
conclude that it does, based on my evaluation of the following four factors. " 82 I proceed
now with an examination of these factors.
1. ''History and Ubiquity"
The first of the test's four prongs, "history and ubiquity," rests in part on the above
assumption that religious words are capable of stimulating secular thoughts without serving
religious purposes. "The constitutional value of ceremonial deism turns on a shared
understanding of its legitimate nonreligious purposes," Justice O'Connor writes. "That sort of
understanding can exist only when a given practice has been in place for a significant portion of
the Nation's history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it can fairly be called

81

!d.

82

/d. at 37.
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ubiquitous." 83 To this is added the argument that "the history of a given practice is all the more
relevant when the practice has been employed pervasively without engendering significant
controversy. " 84 In other words, we are asked to respect a practice on account of its endurance
and familiarity, and on account of the tacit approval accorded that practice. These attributes,
however, should not be permitted to immunize an official acknowledgement of religion. The
same attributes, after all, attached to unconstitutional laws permitting slavery, segregation, antimiscegenation, and gender discrimination. Clearly, a legislative act can be flawed from its
inception. As Justice Brennan observed: '"Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies
of the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, fuid the press of business, do not
always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact, and this must
be assumed to be as true of the Members of the First Congress as any other." 85
Underlying the ubiquity component of Justice O'Connor's first prong is the notion that
religious language loses strength by dint of routine repetition. 86 "Any religious freight the words
may have been meant to carry originally has long since been lost." 87 We are asked to believe
that broad, sustained practice enervates content. This view anchors not only the "history and
ubiquity" factor but also the whole of Justice O'Connor's argument. Commentators, however,
generally contest the idea. 88 For one thing, the view does not explain how religious words lose
strength as religious words, whereas secular words such as "liberty and justice" retain strength in
their secular capacity. In addition, the view ''suggests that, when "initially used,' phrases like 'in
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God we trust' and 'under God' 'violated the Establishment Clause because they had not yet been
rendered meaningless by repetitive use. "' 89 Indeed, this critique can be extended to an
individual's first encounters with official acknowledgements of religion-to, for instfu!Ce, a
child's or adult immigrant's initial exposure to the Pledge. That is, the logic of Justice
O'Connor's argument from longstanding national exposure is no less applicable to individual
exposure: for every American, there is a period during which "under God" must necessarily
retain its divine import, and during which the Establishment Clause is accordingly implicated.
A court guided by the principle of ubiquity arrogates to itself an unpredictable powernamely, the power to decide which words and therefore ideas retain vitality. Armed with this
power, the Court can either uphold an official acknowledgment by declaring it dead, or forbid an
acknowledgment by declaring it in the pink of health. In respect of the Pledge, the former
approach-to say that "under God" lacks vigor qua religious language-discounts the effect that
words register on believers and nonbelievers alike. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor
overlooks the injury sustained by atheists such as Michael Newdow. On the other hand, Justice
0' Connor overlooks the relevance of ''under God" to adherents of religion-as witnessed during
the protests of citizens and politicians following the Ninth Circuit's ruling against California's
Pledge statute. 90 In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Thomas decried the ubiquity argument for this
very reason. "[RJepetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional
meaning. Words like 'God' are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each
successive utterance."91 Professor Douglas Laycock also dismissed the notion that these
religious references are destitute of religious significance. In the amicus brief he prepared for
89

Myers v. Loudoun County Pub Schs., 418 F. 3d 395,405 (4th Cir. Va. 2005) (quoting Sherman v.
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90
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Newdovv on behalf of thirty-two Jewish and Christian clergy, Laycock offered this colorful
disjunctive: "Either government is asking school children to make a sincere statement of belief
in the one true God Whom the Nation is under, or it is asking children to take the name of the
Lord in vain. Neither request is consistent with government's duty of neutrality toward and
among religions." 92
Another concern attaches to the first of Justice O'Connor's four prongs. Assume,

arguendo, that ubiquity does numb individuals to religious connotation. The detachment that
settles over individuals on account of routine will just as effortlessly disperse upon moments of
national crisis. At such times-in the wake of 9/11 hostilities, for instance-official references
to God and religion may lose their rumored weakness. The "reasonable observer," on hand
during a national crisis, would doubtless perceive a great deal of religious freight in stout
utterances of "under God" and other sacred phrasings; the reasonable observer would fmd it
difficult to believe that the government had not conveyed a message "that religion or religious
belief is favored or preferred." 93 At best, then, the words are dormant offenses to the
Establishment Clause, susceptible to reawakening upon, for instance, a religiously motivated
attack on our soil. This phenomenon raises a valid challenge to the

~~ubiquity"

prong, and it does

so using elements central to Justice O'Connor's support of that factor. Duration and diffusion,
according to Justice O'Connor, govern the meaning of words. If, however, time and place
exhaust a word's religious meaning, it should not be wondered that time and place can revivify
that meaning.
The "history and ubiquity" prong hinges on the untenable claim that a reasonable
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(2004) (No. 1624).
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observer, fully aware of the Pledge's history and origins, would not regard "under God" as a
government endorsement.94 To the contrary, the legislative history of the 1954 amendment to
the Pledge95 reveals that "the sole purpose was to advance religion .... " 96 Sen. Homer Ferguson,
sponsor of the 1954 measure to add the words "under God," said, "'I have felt that the Pledge ...
should recognize the Creator who we really believe is in control of the destinies of this great
Republic."97 Both Sen. Ferguson and Rep. Louis Rabaut, sponsor of the measure in the House,
regarded the addition of "under God" as a means of differentiating Americans from our Cold
War enemy, the "atheistic" Communists. 98 A statement by Rep. Rabaut, adopted by the House
Report, explained that the amended Pledge would alert Americans "to the true meaning of our
country and its form of government." 99 "More importantly," he continued, "the children of our
land, in the daily recitation of the Pledge in school, will be daily impressed with a true
understanding of our way of life and its origins." 100 The congressman was not merely speaking
of "under God" in terms of the historical appreciation it would arouse; rather, he was talking
about the present ("our way of life"). Justice O'Connor has embraced the former application of
the words-namely, "to commemorate the role of religion in our history" 101 ; the latter
application, however, invokes an improper governmental use of religious words. The newly
94
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minted Pledge, according to the congressman, not only says that we are a religious people, but is
intended to impress this upon children. l\!Iore tellingly yet, Rep. Rabaut declared that the
~~unbridgeable

gap between America and Communist Russia is a belief in Almighty God ....

[U]nless we are willing to affirm our belief in the existence of God ... we ... open the floodgates
to tyranny and oppression." 102 Clearly, the addition of"under God" represented religious intent
on the part of legislators. "The claim that the addition of 'under God' conveys only a trivial
religious meaning ignores the multiple specific, extensive, and quite pointedly religious
arguments of every government official who spoke on the matter and was directly responsible for
making the change." 103 Under McGowan v. Maryland, this shift in legislative intent is not only
relevant but controlling. McGowan, which stressed the importance of legislative intent, upheld
Sunday closing laws on grounds that language in the most current statutes reflected an "air of ...
relaxation rather than one ofreligion." 104 McGowan, in other words, held that whereas Sunday
closings originated out of nakedly religious purposes-purposes no longer deemed constitutional
under Establishment Clause jurisprudence-laws supporting the closings had been updated to
reflect secular rather than sacred purposes. Thus updated, the Sunday closing laws overcame
challenge under the Establishment Clause. McGowan, therefore, prompts scrutiny of evolving
legislative intent. Applied to the Pledge, the principle of McGowan reveals an unacceptable
reversal: legislative backing for the 1954 Act substituted religious intent for secular intent. This
conclusion is hardly shocking, given the legislative sweat and histrionics exerted on behalf of
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two words: "under God." 105 The shift, though, reveals the unconstitutionality of the Pledge. If

McGowan upheld Sunday closing laws on account of a religious-to-secular shift in legislative
intent, the 1954 Act must be rejected on account of its secular-to-religious shift, whereby a
secular oath became religious.
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the "reasonable observer" creates another problem. On
its face, the Endorsement Test exists to protect "outsiders." 106 Assuming, arguendo, that the
Pledge was amended for wholly secular reasons, the proper focus should nonetheless fall upon
school children-that is, the reasonable school child and not a reasonable observer of ripe age. It
is children, after all, who are made to recite or, minimally, listen to the Pledge; who, on account
of their age and mandatory confmement, are uniquely impressionable, uniquely vulnerable.
Moreover, the Lemon test and endorsement test look to the effect of a government action, not
merely its purpose; it is necessary to determine, here, whether the effect of Pledge recitation is to
communicate to children a message that government endorses religion. Unfortunately, Justice
O'Connor's ceremonial deism test restricts analysis to the viewpoint of an adult (the "reasonable
observer"), preventing accurate assessment of injury.
2. ''Absence of Worship or Prayer"
The "absence of worship or prayer" factor omits significant questions and analyses.
First, Justice O'Connor provides an insufficient definition of prayer and worship. ''Any
statement that has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind, or that
is intended to create a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid, strays from the legitimate
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secular purposes of solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious history."

107

No

mention is made of praise, notwithstanding the universally acknowledged role of praise in the
context ofprayer. 108 Arguably, though, the Pledge more than gestures toward praise, in
consequence of which it may be correct to think of the Pledge in terms of prayer. Second,
Justice O'Connor focuses on intent alone, rather than on intent and effect ("any statement that
has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind .... " 109). But the
endorsement test concerns itself with whether a reasonable observer would perceive a
government endorsement of religion, irrespective of government's purpose. 110 Third, the
"'absence of worship or prayer" factor does not allow for psychological equivalencies between
prayer and oaths. Justice O'Connor appears to forestall this criticism. "Of course, any statement
can be imbued by a speaker or listener with the qualities of prayer. But ... [a reasonable]
observer could not conclude that reciting the Pledge, including the phrase 'under God,'
constitutes an instance of worship." 111 Again, though, the proper viewpoint for this analysis
should be that of a reasonable school child, not that of an adult. 112 It may remain an open
question whether adults regard the Pledge as touching on prayer. Children, on the other hand,
are more likely to construe the oath as a spiritual petition. Research, in fact, points to this very
phenomenon. "Social science research has ... found that insofar as young schoolchildren ascribe
107
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any meaning to the Pledge, they perceive 'under God' as expressing religious belief: 'The
questionnaire responses showed that a number of second-grade children believed the Pledge of
Allegiance was a prayer to God. "' 113
If it can be shown that elements of prayer are absent from the Pledge, comparable
attributes may offset such absence. For instance, the Ten Commandments do not necessitate
prayer, but the Stone Court held against state-mandated postings of the Commandments on
classroom walls. 114 "If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all,
it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the
Commandments. l-Iowever desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a
permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause." 115 Applied to the Pledge, Stone
raises valid questions about the effect of"under God," not least because the Pledge involves
recitation by children. The risk inherent in the act-of intoning "under God" in ritualistic
fashion-is arguably greater than that implicated by posting the Decalogue. The "absence of
worship or prayer" prong, therefore, is too narrow.
Justice O'Connor unnecessarily downplays the religious import of"under God." "Even
if taken literally," she writes, "the phrase is merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the
United States as a Nation subject to divine authority." 116 Having thus designated the phrase, she
is able to conclude that the reasonable observer would not detect an element of worship in the
Pledge. However, in order to reach this conclusion, she omits to grapple with the logical relation
and meaning of words within the text. It must first be observed that "allegiance" is a potent
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word. "Allegiance" is defined as

'~the

fidelity owed by a subject or citizen to a sovereign or

govemment." 117 Additionally, "'allegiance" is defined as "devotion or loyalty to a person, group,
or cause.~' 118 "Allegiance" in the Pledge is sworn to the "republic," which is "'under God";
definitions of"under" include "subject to the authority, control, guidance, or instruction of." 119
If, then, "allegiance" is being sworn to the ''republic," which is "under God," it follows that
"allegiance" (devotion or loyalty) is being surrendered onto God (to whose authority and control
the republic is subject). The hierarchical development of this claim follows cleanly in the text,
its logic and momentum established by the relation of "republic" to ''flag": "I pledge allegiance
to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands ...." This
interrelation of words suggests a not insignificant religious dimension, the effect of which is to
greatly surpass "merely descriptive" phrasing. Even prior to the addition of "under God," the
Court in Barnette observed: ''[T]he ... pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind." 120 The addition of"under God," therefore, raises valid questions about the prayer or
worship aspects of the Pledge, particularly owing to the performance aspects of this national
institution. 121 At the very least, "under God" cannot be deemed ''merely descriptive." ''To
recite that the nation is 'under God,' writes Douglas Laycock, "is inherently a religious
affirmation." 122 ''When we pledge allegiance to One nation under God, our citizens participate in
an important American tradition of humbly seeking the wisdom and blessing of Divine
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Providence." 123

3. "Absence of Reference to Particular Religion"
The "absence of reference to particular religion" prong ignores the plain language of the
Pledge. The plain language evokes a particular understanding of deity and therefore favors one
form of religion over other forms of religion. First, "under God" invokes the deity of
monotheistic religion. Hindus, Buddhists, Wiccans, Native Americans, even Secular
Humanists 124 are effectively marginalized by the religious component of the Pledge-either
because they believe in multiple gods or in no god at all. Second, ~'under God" implies an
interventionist deity with interest in and jurisdiction over the United States. Among those
alienated, in this instance, are none other than deists. 125
To date, the Court's ceremonial deism analysis has been highly colored by the JudeoChristian beliefs of the majority of American society .... Specifically, the selective
application of ceremonial deism only to those religious symbols consistent with the
Judeo-Christian tradition ... serves both to overlook and exclude nonadherents from the
definition of what it means to be an "American." This in turn threatens to rend the
·~fabric of society" because it reiterates the force of religion in maintaining standing in the
political community. 126
The theological connotations of "under God," therefore, confer a benefit upon adherents
to monotheistic religions. The majority in McCreary County stressed that the Establishment
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Clause requires government to observe neutrality in respect of religion. The majority countered
the dissent's claim that "the deity the Framers had in mind was the God of monotheism, with the
consequence that government may espouse a tenet of traditional monotheism." 127 On the
contrary, argued the majority, the Framers operated within a much more religiously
circumscribed mentality; their pressing concern involved contests among Christian bodies, not
other religious bodies-not even other monotheistic religions. 128 "Justice Story probably
reflected the thinking of the framing generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the
purpose of the [Establishment] Clause was 'not to countenance, much less to advance,
Ma.~ometanism,

or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry

among Christian sects."' 129 From this, the Court noted, it is evident that interpretation of the
Constitution will necessarily result in ''applications unanticipated by the Framers," 130 and that the
spirit of the Framers must be honored in such a way as to strive for neutrality in matters of
religion pertinent to our time. 131
By definition, the "absence of reference to particular religion" factor does not address
whether an official act amounts to an unconstitutional preference in favor of religion over

nonreligion. Neither does Justice O'Connor's application of her test demonstrate any sympathy
for this issue. 132 Under the Establishment Clause, however, "the touchstone for our analysis is
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the principle that the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion. "' 133 "The First Amendment leaves the
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. The philosophy is that the
atheist or agnostic-the nonbeliever-is entitled to go his own way." 134 In 2008, more than 1.6
million adults identified themselves as atheists-almost double the amount in 2001. 135 The
Pledge imposes special difficulties on atheists, not least the suggestion that belief in and
submission to God is a mark of good citizenship. Michael Newdow shared his own burden
during oral argument before the Court: "I am an atheist. I don't believe in God. And every
school morning my child is asked to stand up, face that flag, put her hand over her heart, and say
that her father is wrong." 136 Hence, this prong of the ceremonial deism test offers unclear
guidance, to the extent that it does not wrestle with a broader standard of protection available
under the Establishment Clause.
4. ''Minimal Religious Content"
The "minimal religious content" factor underestimates the potency of religious language,
particularly of references to the divine. Justice 0' Connor dismisses the effect of ""under God" in
the Pledge by means of a questionably relevant contrast: two words in the context of a thirty-oneword recitation. 137 References to God, however, bear great conceptual weight. 138 In the Pledge
itself, ''under God" encompasses ''flag," "'republic," "nation"-the whole secular reality. 139 In
addition, the unequal balance between secular and sacred language in a text may be offset by
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other factors. Here, where legislators added "under God" to a popular, secular text, and did so to
great fanfare, those added words assumed a heft unrecognized by Justice O'Connor's simple
arithmetic. What is important is not the quantitative relation between the sacred and secular
words but rather their qualitative relation.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor's attempt to systematize analysis of ceremonial deism, while
commendable, fails to legitimate this legal concept. Her method trades on assumptions
that her four prongs not only fail to offset, but ultimately rely upon. Central to her test is
the notion that official references to God no longer haul "religious freight." 140 This,
however, is an assumption whose inherent troubles Justice O'Connor never dispels. The
assumption assigns arbitrary power to judges, who are not equipped to dabble in the field
of"semantic shift." Also key to Justice O'Connor's test is her reliance upon the
"reasonable observer," a fictive adult with what appears to be an unflappable religious
sensibility. As I have shown, however, this standard deserts members of society whom
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test purports to champion: "nonadherents" and
"outsiders." 141 In the context of ceremonial deism, the reasonable observer standard
offers inadequate protection to dissidents and children. This is especially troubling in
respect of the latter class of individuals, whom the Court has otherwise shielded from
creeping indoctrination and coercion. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court observed: "[T]here
are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive
pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools .... Our decisions in Engel v.

Vitale and School Dist. ofAbington recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises
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in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion." 142 In view of this concern,
the Lee Court held against graduations prayers led by a member of clergy, "under
circumstances where ... young graduates who object are induced to conform."

143

Applied to the Pledge, it is doubly likely that school children will face coercive pressure,
not least because of policies requiring daily recitation of the oath. Under Lee, it should
not matter that students are permitted to opt out of the Pledge: their tender age, coupled
with the unique environment, can induce conformity. But Justice O'Connor's reasonable
observer standard ignores the child's perception. So, too, does her test ignore the
question of physical context (e.g., a classroom environment). An additional prong would
correct this oversight, provided the reasonable observer standard were concomitantly
enlarged. In addition to a context prong, and in view of Lee, the test would also benefit
from a coercion prong.
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